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SHOULD THE LAW IGNORE COMMERCIAL 
NORMS? A COMMENT ON THE BERNSTEIN 
CONJECTURE AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR 
CONTRACT LAW THEORY AND REFORM 
Jason Scott Johnston* 
Professor Bernstein's study1 of the interaction between private law 
and norms in the cotton industry is the latest installment in her 
ongoing investigation into the relationship between law and norms in 
trades ranging from the diamond market to grain and feed markets. 
Her incredibly detailed and thorough exploration of private 
lawmaking and commercial norms - and their interaction - stands as 
one of the most significant contributions to contract and commercial 
law scholarship made in the last half-century. The cotton industry 
study upon which I focus in this Comment not only reports fascinating 
findings about dispute resolution practices, but also presents a number 
of intriguing and complementary theoretical insights into those 
practices. Bernstein's empirical findings call into question some of the 
fundamental results in the economic analysis of contract law, such as 
the theory that expectation damages induce efficient breach of 
contract. Her central induction from her discoveries about cotton 
industry practices is that the best way for the law to encourage the 
development of extralegal norms of commercial reasonableness and 
the enforcement of those norms via commercial reputation may be, 
paradoxically, to make those norms irrelevant in formal dispute 
resolution. This hypothesis - which I dub the "Bernstein Conjecture" 
- suggests that the underlying methodological supposition in Article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code - that the law should mirror or 
reflect actual commercial norms - may in fact be destructive of the 
very norms it seeks to incorporate. This is no small implication. For 
this reason, after beginning with a few methodological quibbles, the 
bulk of this Comment focuses on the Bernstein Conjecture. I first 
develop an informal but quite general analysis of the role of the law in 
deterring commercial opportunism, and I then focus more precisely on 
identifying the social and market context in which the Bernstein 
Conjecture is likely to hold. 
* Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law and Director, Program on Law and 
Environment, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B. 1978, Dartmouth; J.D. 1981, 
Ph.D. 1984, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
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I. METHODOLOGY AND SIGNIFICANCE 
A. A Peculiar, but Important, Empiricism 
(Vol. 99:1791 
Bernstein's paper is laudably ambitious. She explains the strategic 
logic behind the cotton industry's mix of private lawmaking 
institutions and nonlegal sanctions, and she theorizes about the lessons 
that may be drawn from the cotton industry for commercial law more 
generally. The paper nicely integrates theory with evidence. This 
ambitious integration, however, also tends at times to obscure the 
fascinating empirical questions and answers provided by Bernstein's 
study. Regardless of whether one is persuaded that Bernstein has 
really succeeded in explaining cotton industry practices, the empirical 
evidence that she has uncovered about those practices has some very 
important implications for contract law. 
Before discussing the implications of Bernstein's findings, a brief 
methodological digression is in order. Bernstein's empirical data is 
primarily qualitative. It consists of recorded interviews with cotton 
industry traders. (apparently done mostly over the telephone) and 
arbitration case files. Her characterization of the data is likewise 
qualitative. Sometimes this kind of characterization of the data is 
inconsequential. For instance, she says that many years ago, prior 
arbitration opinions were "sometimes" mentioned as guiding authority 
but today are "rarely" mentioned. 2 Bernstein does not tell us precisely 
what she means by "sometimes" and "rarely." The reader is left to 
infer that these terms are being used in a relative sense, relative to the 
frequency with which one might expect to see references to prior 
opinions in the published judicial decisions. The vague descriptors 
"sometimes" and "rarely" do not cause any trouble for Bernstein here, 
primarily because the role of precedent in cotton industry arbitration 
is peripheral to Bernstein's main claims about arbitration's function in 
the cotton industry. 
More troublesome is her qualitative characterization of private law 
adjudication in cotton arbitration proceedings. Bernstein repeatedly 
characterizes as "formalistic" the reasoning in cotton arbitration 
decisions.3 She claims that although parties' briefs "often make 
arguments based on good faith . . .  , notions of good faith and fairness 
do not appear to affect case outcomes. "4 She says that even though 
one set of formal trade rules (the Southern Mill Rules - "SMRs" -
that govern merchant-to-mill transactions) explicitly directs arbitrators 
2. Id. at 1730 n.30. 
3. See, e.g., id. at 1735, 1737-38. 
4. Id. at 1734 & nn.51-53. 
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to look to industry custom to fill gaps in contracts, "unlike 
courts[,] . . .  arbitrators are reluctant to find that gaps exist and they do 
not permit custom to trump or vary trade rules or explicit contractual 
provisions. "5 Another important set of formal trade rules (those of the 
Memphis Cotton Exchange - "MCE" - governing contracts 
between traders) is silent on the role of custom, but she says that 
arbitrators in this system do not actually take custom into account, as 
evidenced by the fact that custom is mentioned only three times in 
MCE opinions over the 1944-1991 period. 6 Similarly, she finds custom 
mentioned in only four of the forty-two B.A. opinions over the 1929-
1951 petiod. 7 Bernstein in fact cites the ninety-one instances in which 
cotton arbitrators apparently did attempt to craft split-the-difference, 
compromise results because they felt that such a result was fair. 8 It is 
difficult to judge the significance of these opinions, just as it is difficult 
to assess her report that custom is infrequently mentioned in arbitral 
opinions. The problem is that the comparison between the court 
system and cotton industry arbitration is left unquantified: there is no 
comparison between, for instance, the rate at which courts refer to 
custom in cotton arbitration versus the rate in some sample of judicial 
opinions applying Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Yet Bernstein clearly means to contrast the way cotton arbitrators 
decide cases under formal industry trade rules with the way in which 
courts decide cases under the Uniform Commercial Code: cotton 
industry arbitrators steadfastly and formalistically follow bright-line 
trade rules, while courts applying Article 2 roam about through a 
jungle of oral testimony about industry and relational norms on a 
Quifotian search for commercial "reasonableness." These ·are very 
important but also very broad qualitative characterizations. They are, 
moreover, the sort of qualitative judgments· that define traditional, 
doctrinal legal scholarship. With the proliferation in recent years of 
"interdisciplinary" legal scholarship -'- law arid economics, law and 
behavioral economics, law and norms, law and society, law and 
history, law and critical theory, and so on - doctrinal scholarship has 
fallen· rather out of fashion. Doctrinal scholarship is perceived by 
many cutting-edge legal academics as sorely lacking in "rigor." In at 
least one crucial way, however, doctrinal analysis is really very 
scientific. Because they are interested mostly in persuading the reader 
that a particular recent opinion was sensible or foolish and ought to 
have .limited or vast precedential effect, doctrinal scholars usually find 
it necessary to talk about judicial opinions at great length. Even in the 
5. Id. at 1736. 
6. Id. at 1736. 
7. Id. at 1736 n.63. 
8. Id. at 1734 n.52. 
1794 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1791 
text of their articles, they really get into the guts of opinions, often 
quoting long passages. At the end (or even before the end if the 
reader does not have the stamina to get that far), the reader is in a 
pretty good position to assess the strength of the author's interpretive 
characterization. 
Without getting into hermeneutic fine points, one can see how 
conventional doctrinal scholarship facilitates interpretive critique and 
thus enables a kind of qualitative verification process. One wishes that 
Bernstein's description of cotton industry disputing practices were 
equally amenable to critique. As it is, the reader does not really have :a 
baseline - qualitative or quantitative - against which to assess her 
claims regarding ·the empirical superiority of the cotton industry's 
private law system to the Article 2 public law system. 
There is, of course, the obvious functionalist argument that 
because cotton industry participants continue to use their own private 
law system rather than public legal system, they must find it superior. 
Below, I shall have more to say about the validity and implications of 
this kind of survival-of-the-fittest line of reasoning about alternative 
legal systems. 9 My present point is that Bernstein's methodology - an 
essentially qualitative analysis of case file and interview data - does 
not permit empirical evaluation of the relative efficiency of alternative 
dispute resolution systems. She presents data on the infrequency of 
arbitrated disputes in the cotton industry from which one ··can 
reasonably conclude, as she does, that the vast majority of disputes in 
that industry are resolved informally. But the vast majority ·of 
commercial contract disputes are also resolved informally and without 
litigation in the public legal system. Without some sense of contract 
dispute resolution in those industries that for whatever reason do not 
have their own private legal system, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
draw comparative lessons from Bernstein's findings. 
Bernstein's study is tremendously valuable, not for comparative 
purposes, but in revealing features of the cotton industry's private law 
system that neither standard doctrinal nor quantitative empirical work 
could uncover. Formal cotton industry trade rules are silent about the 
implied duty of good faith10 and make course of performance and 
course of dealing between contracting parties irrelevant to an 
arbitrator's determination of their intentions.11 The industry has 
adopted a simple and inflexible measure of damages given by the 
difference between contract and market price plus a one-half cent per 
pound penalty.12 Failure to comply with an arbitral award is grounds 
9. See Part III infra. 
10. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1734 & nn.51-54. 
11. Id. at 1735 & n.58. 
12. Id. at 1733. 
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for expulsion from cotton shippers' associations and from the Cotton 
Exchange.13 Membership in the association of cotton mills, however, is 
not affected by a mill's failure to comply with an award. 
As for the significance of reputation within the cotton industry, 
Bernstein recounts a number of conversations with both growers and 
mill owners to the effect that reputation is "essential" to transacting 
within the industry. 14 Mill owners - cotton buyers - reported that 
because the quality of cotton is so "subtle and subjective," and yet 
they often make deals over the phone without physical inspection of 
the goods, it is crucial that the buyer know about the seller and be able 
to rely on his word regarding quality.15 A cotton market participant's 
commercial reputation depends on whether he has performed as 
promised (has the mill promptly accepted delivery? has the merchant 
delivered the promised quality of goods on time?), as well as on his 
willingness to be flexible in the face of changing circumstances, even 
to the point of being willing to renegotiate key terms of the deal.16 
Reputation must be verifiably communicated to be valuable. Such 
information transmission was a simple social fact in the rural, small­
town south in which the industry arose, where mill owners were town 
leaders, and where the members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange 
saw each other daily and "viewed themselves as being part of the same 
club."17 One of Bernstein's most interesting and important discoveries 
is the deliberate production in recent years of more formal institutions 
for transmitting information about industry norms and individual 
reputations for complying with those norms. An eight-week summer 
Cotton Institute instructs new merchants in the content of the trading 
rules. Although norm violations are not formally determinative of 
arbitrators' decisions, (some) arbitration opinions are circulated 
within the industry, and these often include what Bernstein describes 
as "preachy statements about what is and what is not acceptable 
business behavior."18 Independent private publications as well as trade 
association circulars now rate the financial responsibility of cotton 
shippers and buyers.19 
13. Id. at 1737. 
14. Id. at 1746. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1744. 
17. Id. at 1750. 
18. Id. at 1773. 
19. Id. at 1753. 
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B.· Law's Role in Contract Breach and Renegotiation: 
The Bernstein Conjecture 
Bernstein's findings about cotton industry dispute resolution 
practices alone carry some important lessons for contract law and 
theory. Perhaps most important is what Bernstein's conversations 
revealed about the way cotton industry participants understand 
contract breach. Bernstein's respondents clearly repudiated the notion 
that they were indifferent between getting damages for breach and 
receiving promised performance.20 The respondents also provided an 
explanation for their unwillingness to accept breach and payment of 
damages as a substitute for performance: from a cotton mill's point of 
view, the reason for purchasing cotton forward, rather than on spot 
markets, is to ensure continuity and provide certainty. Similarly, 
cotton merchants shift risk from growers to themselves, but the risk to 
merchants themselves would be intolerable were they not able to shift 
risk downstream to mills . 21 For both merchants and mills, breach 
destroys the fundamental reason for contracting. Or, more accurately 
in terms of Bernstein's findings, while a single breach caused by 
unusual circumstances may be forgiven, a pattern of breach by a 
particular merchant or mill will not be forgotten. Such a pattern not 
only makes it foolish for the immediate victim to trust the breaching 
party again, but other market participants will learn of the pattern, 
and they, too, will avoid dealing with the offending party. Bernstein 
has discovered that, in the cotton industry, the legal damage measure 
is in a certain sense irrelevant. No matter what the damage measure 
might be, it simply cannot replace performance. 
This is not to say that the formal cotton industry trade rules simply 
dispense with damages for breach. Rather, as Bernstein explains in 
some detail, because of the complexity and cost of getting expectancy­
based damages, cotton industry trade rules provide a very simple, low­
cost damage measure - the difference between contract and market 
price plus a fixed per-pound penalty.22 Especially given the low-cost, 
streamlined procedures in cotton industry arbitration, these market­
difference damages would appear to do a relatively good job of 
compensating for and deterring breach motivated solely by big swings 
in market price. But no measure of damages can really compensate a 
trader for dealing with someone with a known propensity to find lots 
of reasons, whether real or concocted, for degrading performance (by, 
for example, delivering late or poor quality goods, or by refusing to 
20. Id. at 1750. 
21. Id. at 1776. 
22. Id. at 1756. 
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accept goods without a discount). Hence, it is not legal but extralegal 
sanctions that deter such patterned opportunism. 23 
This is an exceptionally important empirical finding. The economic 
analysis of contract law begins (both historically and often 
analytically) from the demonstration that perfectly compensatory 
expectation-based contract damages create an incentive for efficient 
breach - breach when performance would generate lower net value 
than some alternative performance (including not performing at all, as 
when performance cost rises dramatically). 24 Bernstein's study reveals 
that it is precisely in those markets where forward contracts are most 
important - volatile commodity markets - that efficient breach 
approaches utter nonsense. On such markets, the point of having a 
contract is to reduce uncertainty and guard against unanticipated 
market price changes. Were every such price change to trigger breach 
on one side of the market or the other (depending upon the direction 
of the market-price change), the market would literally disintegrate. 
However efficient the market's formal dispute resolution mechanism 
- and Bernstein presents plenty of evidence that the cotton industry's 
is highly efficient - such markets simply cannot wait for the 
consequences of breach to be remedied. They must not occur in the 
first place. 
The fact that sophisticated cotton traders regard contract breach as 
a violation of industry norms should cause law and economics scholars 
to rethink seriously the relevance of the efficient breach model. Some 
of Bernstein's other findings make one doubt that law - whether 
public or private - matters much at all in industries like cotton that 
have strong systems of nonlegal sanctions. Bernstein reports that news 
of the outcomes of most arbitrated disputes between merchants 
quickly reaches other merchants, and that opinions of the Board of 
Appeals ("BoA") (deciding disputes between mills and merchants) 
are actually sent to all members of mill associations.25 Even though the 
trade rules do not impose an explicit good faith requirement, 
arbitrators' opinions apparently quite often comment explicitly upon 
the commercial acceptability of the parties' behavior.26 Given that 
arbitration results and opinions are quite widely disseminated within 
the industry, Bernstein is certainly correct in thinking that a party's 
reputation could suffer from the explicit condemnation of an 
experienced and knowledgeable arbitrator.27 
23. Id. at 1755-85. 
24. For the classic analysis, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated 
Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement 
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). 
25. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1730. 
26. Id. at 1734 nn.52-54. 
27. Id. at 1768-69. 
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But even. granting that arbitrators often include lots of very 
judgmental stuff in their opinions, stuff highly relevant to commercial 
reputation, it is hard to see how those opinions could in fact play an 
important role in reputation formation. First, not all opinions are 
available to nonparties. Bernstein does not explain why opinions 
handed down by the MCE (resolving disputes between merchants) are 
not made public,28 while those decided by the BoA are actually sent to 
all members of the largest mill associations.29 Second, there are very 
few cotton industry arbitrations at all - and even fewer where both 
parties are actually staying in business. Apparently the MCE and BoA 
each averaged about two arbitrations per year over Bernstein's study 
period,30 while there were only twenty-eight merchant-mill disputes 
brought before the BoA over the twenty-one-year period 1975-1996.31 
Although Bernstein oddly does not provide this data, one suspects 
that a large fraction of arbitrations involves end-game situations, 
where, because of bankruptcy or death, the defendant is going out of 
business.32 Bernstein's findings suggest that arbitration under the 
formal trade rules does not play a very large direct role in reputation 
formation.33 
This is in fact consistent with Bernstein's own interpretation of the 
cotton industry interviews. She stresses that the primary significance 
of private law for the parallel world of commercial norms and nonlegal 
sanctions is not direct but rather indirect. 34 What is crucial about the 
cotton industry trade rules is their form: they provide a background of 
clear, bright-line performance obligations against which cotton traders 
bargain to resolve disputes and overcome unforeseen contingencies. 
Cotton traders have an incentive to behave reasonably not because 
formal cotton trade rules explicitly tell them to do so, but because if 
they don't, they will acquire reputations for opportunism and face 
fewer or less valuable trading opportunities in the future. Were the 
law to attempt to mirror commercial norms of reasonableness by 
requiring reasonableness, Bernstein concludes, it would severely 
hinder the process by which reputation develops and tend to destroy 
the system of nonlegal sanctions. 
This in my view is Bernstein's central hypothesis. It is a brilliant 
and fascinating conjecture. If true of markets in general - rather than 
28. Id. at 1.730. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 1762. 
31. Id. at 1728 n.18. 
32. Id. at 1738-40 & nn.71-74. 
33. This conclusion is reinforced by Bernstein's finding that the parties' names are 
redacted from the formal opinions. 
34. Bernstein, supra note 1, at Sections 111.3-III.4. 
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only those that bear structural similarities to the cotton trade - it 
would have powerful implications for public law reform. Its truth, 
however, is not at all obvious. For Bernstein's is a conjecture about 
how legal form - the choice between the cotton trade's bright-line 
obligations and the UCC's open-textured standards - affects the 
evolution and maintenance of commercial norms and nonlegal 
sanctions for their violation. As I explain below, the relationship 
between legal form and the evolution of commercial norms is 
complex, depending upon market and social structures that are 
historically contingent and highly contextual. Before exploring her 
conjecture further, one must first clarify more generally the 
relationship between legal and extralegal sanctions. 
II. LAW, NORMS, AND CONTRACfUAL OPPORTUNISM 
Perhaps the fundamental contribution of the Chicago school to the 
study of contract law is the insight that when courts take an open­
textured approach and make contract obligations depend upon 
"reasonable" or "good faith" behavior, they remain imperfect.35 True, 
courts will often correctly identify and sanction bad faith behavior, 
cutting both the cost (to the victim) and the benefit (to the 
perpetrator) of contractual opportunism, but they sometimes miss 
instances of bad faith, and they sometimes mistakenly conclude that a 
party has acted in bad faith when all it has done is exercise a clear 
contractual right. The victim of such a judicial error ends up 
uncompensated or must pay damages even though it did not in fact 
engage in bad faith. Such a damage award encourages opportunistic 
actors to make unfounded claims that the other party acted in bad 
faith. False positives thus increase both the cost (to the victim) and 
benefit (to the perpetrator) of contractual opportunism. 
If the risk of false judicial determinations of bad faith is sufficiently 
low, then a legally enforceable duty of good faith and reasonable 
behavior may actually improve market efficiency. It may do so by 
lowering the barrier to entry created by established reputation. As 
Bernstein shows, especially when contract performance involves a 
significant subjective component and varies greatly across alternative 
contracting partners, market participants have a very strong incentive 
to learn about the quality of alternative contracting partners and to 
stick with those who establish a reputation for quality, fair dealing, 
and flexibility in the face of unforeseen circumstances. They are 
hesitant to take a chance with a new entrant to the market whose 
reputation cannot be ascertained. If enforced with sufficient accuracy, 
35. Articles that elegantly set forth this insight include Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel 
R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986), and Richard 
A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1989). 
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legal sanctions for bad faith behavior lessen the risk of going with such 
a new entrant, thus encouraging entry and helping to make markets 
more competitive. 3 6  
As a theoretical matter, therefore, judicial policing of contractual 
opportunism is likely to improve market efficiency only when courts 
narrow the forms of sanctionable opportunism to those that they can 
identify accurately. It is highly unlikely that courts can identify 
instances of "opportunism" premised solely upon the failure of one of 
the parties to comply with a relationship-specific norm of good faith 
that is based not upon trade customs but upon the peculiarities of the 
particular parties. Thus, Bernstein's finding37 that course of dealing 
and performance are given no weight in cotton arbitrations has 
general significance. Arbitrators are no more informed regarding truly 
relationship-specific norms than are courts. Neither arbitrators nor 
courts can verify relationship-specific norms with sufficient accuracy 
to make it efficient to incorporate such norms into the law. 
Bernstein's findings reveal the exclusion from cotton arbitrations 
even of those norms that are customary within the trade and that 
arbitrators, who are themselves experts in the trade, are therefore 
likely to know and understand. Inasmuch as violations of many of 
these norms would be verifiable instances of opportunism, what I have 
said thus far would seem to imply that cotton arbitration may be 
inefficiently ignoring customary norms. This is unlikely to be the case. 
The reason is that my analysis has only focused on private legal 
sanctions as a complement to nonlegal sanctions. Legal sanctions for 
verifiable instances of opportunism can effectively lessen the risk of 
dealing with a new entrant who has not yet acquired a reputation. But 
they also impact the process by which reputation is formed. 
Paradoxically, it may be much easier for parties to generate good 
reputations when the law does not require "good faith" behavior than 
when it does. 
A formal demonstration of this claim is beyond the scope of this 
Comment,38 but to understand the intuition behind it, consider the 
following simple example. Suppqse that by behaving opportunistically 
and claiming that a particular delivery of cotton is inferior when it is 
not, a cotton mill might gain $100 above what it expected under the 
contract. If the rules applied in arbitration made such conduct 
36. Legal sanctions are only effective against defendants with sufficient wealth to pay 
the expected judgment, but unlike reputation, information about a newcomer's balance 
sheet can be acquired with relative accuracy and at relatively low cost. 
37. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1735 & n.58. 
38. The driving idea here is that if a party complies only because it is legally obligated to 
do so, then its reputation is not enhanced; the legal discretion to act in "bad faith" may be 
what makes good faith behavior a credible indicator that the party is cooperative. See 
Arnoud W.A. Boot et al., Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting, 83. AM. ECON. 
REV. 1165 (1993). 
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actionable as breach,. and such conduct were verifiable with a high 
degree of accuracy, then the merchant could credibly threaten to sue 
over such opportunism and thereby deprive the mill of the. $100 gain 
from opportunism. Under such circumstances, . any particular mill's 
reasonable behavior would do nothing toward establishing the mill's 
reputation. The reason is that even if the merchant and mill were 
never going to see each other again, so that the game - the merchant­
mill transaction - were not going to be repeated, the mill's dominant 
strategy would be to eschew opportunism. If the law is so effective that 
it.deters even bad types from cheating, then failure to cheat does not 
reveal anything about a party's propensity to cheat. 
The paradox is that in order to facilitate reputation formation, the 
law must allow some instances of verifiable cheating to go without 
legal sanction. This is not to say that the ideal regime would impose no 
legal sanctions for verifiable cheating. Ideally, the law would ignore all 
but the most grievous and dangerous forms of verifiable opportunism. 
By leaving minor instances of opportunism unsanctioned, the law sets 
up a game in which actors who have a high payoff from opportunism 
will reveal themselves by taking the opportunity. Bernstein's work 
shows that a history of cheating gets around very quickly in the cotton 
industry, triggering the two primary nonlegal sanctions: refusalto deal 
and refusal to cooperate. 
That such nonlegal sanctions exist and are applied does not show 
that they effectively deter all cheating. By repeatedly cheating, a party 
reveals that it is relatively immune to the nonlegal sanctions of 
retaliatory cheating and boycott. The paradigmatic instance of such 
immunity is a monopolist: because the monopolist gets high rents, it 
can survive many rounds of retaliatory cheating . with relative 
impunity, and because it is a monopolist, there is nowhere else for 
buyers to go. 
Bernstein provides hints here and there that cotton mills may 
generally have a stronger bargaining position than merchants.39 Still, 
Bernstein's description of the cotton industry suggests that the 
industry is far from being either a monopoly or a monopsony. But it is 
equally clear from her discussion that the cotton industry· departs 
radically from the textbook description of perfect competition. Cotton 
merchants and mills appear to have highly individualized reputations. 
Her conversations reveal that sometimes a merchant or mill simply 
has to live with obvious and verifiable instances of opportunism. For 
this to be so, it must be that the market is not sufficiently thick for a 
single instance of opportunism to cause the cheater's elimination from 
the market. What Bernstein seems to have found is an equilibrium in 
39. In an earlier version, Bernstein stated that there are "far fewer mills than 
merchants"; id. at 1747 (observing that most merchants operate on "very slim" cash flow 
margins). 
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which the market tolerates low levels of cheating, at least on the part 
of some powerful market participants. This should not be surprising, 
for on this view the strategic reason why the cotton industry's private 
law regime ignores some instances of low-level opportunism is 
precisely in order to create an opportunity for cheating to occur. 
It is important, however, that the private law regime not ignore the 
most serious and potentially damaging instances of verifiable 
opportunism. This is true on both the cost (victim's) and benefit 
(cheater's) side. As Bernstein notes, even the most severe extralegal 
sanctions - ostracism and exclusion from the industry, a virtual 
commercial death sentence - are ineffective against a participant who 
is leaving the industry anyway. What she calls the end-game 
participants - those on the verge of bankruptcy, or family firms 
whose controlling member has died without an obvious successor -
are immune to the ultimate extralegal sanctions of industry ostracism. 
These sanctions do not deny the benefits of opportunism to end-game 
actors. On the victim's side, the problem with extralegal sanctions -
especially third-party refusals to deal in the future - is that they do 
not do anything to compensate the victim for her losses from 
opportunism. If there were no opportunity to get legal damages even 
for the most harmful instances of opportunism, then market 
participants would face enormous risk when dealing with firms that 
are undergoing difficulties and may be tempted by end-game 
opportunism. 
III. IS FORMALISM RIGHT FOR EVERYBODY? 
BERNSTEIN AND PUBLIC LAW REFORM 
There can be little doubt that Bernstein's work has generated 
interesting and important insights into private lawmaking and the 
interaction between legal (albeit private legal) sanctions and nonlegal 
sanctions. She clearly believes,40 however, that her findings have 
implications beyond the world of closely knit merchant communities 
such as the diamond and cotton trades, and implications for public law 
reform. Granted that Bernstein has established that the private law of 
the cotton industry does not attempt to mirror the norms that govern 
work-a-day business relations, does this then establish that Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code rests on a fundamentally mistaken 
philosophy? Karl Llewellyn believed that by making decisions turn on 
arcane and formalistic determinations such as the location of title, the 
law of sales had gone badly awry. In drafting Article 2, he pursued the 
principle that the law of sales should as much as possible simply reflect 
40. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (arguing that her 
findings on private legal systems cast doubt on Article 2's incorporation strategy). 
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commercially reasonable practice.41 The Article 2 provisions that 
Bernstein marks as deviating most dramatically from the private law 
of the cotton trade - such as the priority given to course of 
performance and course of dealing in determining the parties' 
contractual obligations, and the general implied obligation of 
commercially reasonable conduct (the objective good faith obligation) 
- are prime instances of Article 2's general "Reflection" philosophy. 
The question is whether Bernstein is correct in thinking that the 
dramatic distinction between Article 2's open-textured reflection 
strategy and the apparently formalistic approach taken by the private 
law system in the cotton trade means that Article 2 ought to be 
reformed. Another way of putting this question is simply to ask: were 
the formalists correct? Are seemingly arbitrary and imperfect bright­
line legal rules superior to the highly fact-specific effort to make the 
law mirror commercial norms? 
A. Why Social and Market Structure Matter 
The analysis from the previous section strongly supports 
Bernstein's critique of the Code's automatic absorption into a 
commercial contract of concessions and other adjustments made in the 
course of dealing or course of performance. Even if the parties 
intended for such concessions to in fact modify their future 
obligations, there is much too high a probability that courts will err in 
determining what the parties have actually done or said in their prior 
dealings. This high probability of error makes it too easy for a party 
who failed to get a particular term in the contract to insist afterward 
that although the contract does not say a thing about it, the term in 
fact was there, implied by prior dealings or performance.42 Thus, 
course of dealing and course of performance do more to encourage 
opportunism than to prevent it. They discourage the very behavior 
that Article 2 as a whole means to encourage. As Bernstein argues, a 
merchant who reasonably agrees to renegotiate, or make other 
"forgiving adjustments" must worry that those reasonable adjustments 
will harden into fixed contractual obligations by virtue of the Code's 
41. See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's 
Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 
1141, 1164 (1985); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the 
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 471 (1987). 
42. For a very famous instance of this, see Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life 
Insurance Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (where borrower argued for a contractual 
prepayment right on basis of specious ambiguity). 
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incorporation of course of performance and ·course of dealing as 
implied contract terms.43 
This criticism of Article 2 does not, however, imply that the cotton 
industry's formalistic approach is correct for every industry. The 
choice of a formalistic private law by cotton industry participants may 
indicate its efficiency for that industry and hence the efficiency of a 
similarly formalistic approach for identical industries. The problem, of 
course, is that if an industry is really identical to the cotton industry in 
all economically relevant respects, then one ought to observe that 
industry participants have already contracted out of the public law 
system by adopting their own private law system. The failure to 
observe such a private law system is evidence either that an industry is 
not as similar to cotton as it might at first seem, or that important 
noneconomic factors account for the emergence of effective private 
law institutions. Both possibilities may severely limit the relevance of 
Bernstein's findings for general law reform. 
Consider first the significance of an industry's social context. 
Bernstein's own work demonstrates the power of noneconomic factors 
in the evolution of systems of nonlegal commercial sanctions. Both the 
diamond and cotton trades she has studied in detail were historically 
very much closed worlds, with market participation limited to 
individuals from particular religious, ethnic, and/or family groups.44 
Group membership can be an extremely effective entry barrier. These 
entry barriers generate economic rents - supracompetitive profits. 
Such profits make the threat of expulsion from the industry 
enormously powerful. Provided that the market is relatively 
unconcentrated (given the ethno-religious constraint on participation), 
no participant is so crucial as to be beyond the threat of explusion, at 
least for sufficiently serious violations of industry norms. 
That a requirement of ethnic group membership for participation 
in a particular trade can create an effective entry barrier does not 
explain how such trading communities arise in the first place. There is, 
however, abundant historical evidence for the following account.45 
43. Section 2-202 of the U.C.C. explicitly endorses the use of course of dealing or usage 
of trade, see U.C.C. § 1-205, or course of performance, see U.C.C. § 2-208, to interpret the 
parties' contractual obligations. 
44. In addition to Bernstein, supra note 1, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]. Although not emphasized by Bernstein, see id., 
the New York Diamond Dealers Club evolved in precisely such a social and cultural context. 
See ALBERT LUBIN, DIAMOND DEALERS CLUB: A FIFfY-YEAR HISTORY (1982). 
45. See JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING, NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW AND 
G!Ff-EXCHANGE (1994) (surveying rules of ethnic market intermediation groups); 
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 44; Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic 
Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993) 
(discussing rise of Maghribi Coalition in international trade). 
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Suppose that some small number of individuals begin to engage in 
trade in some commodity. Unsure of the reliability of nonlocal legal 
institutions, but desirous of expanding the geographic scope of trade, 
the traders have a very strong interest in minimizing the occurrence of 
disputes. They prefer to deal, either as agents or as contracting 
partners, with family members or other individuals of the same ethnic 
or religious group, because nonlegal sanctions are all that they have. 
The ultimate nonlegal (but still lawful) sanction is expulsion. Before 
any particular ethnic or religious group has come to dominate a trade, 
the threat of expulsion from the trade is weak - group members do 
not earn especially high rents, and even after expulsion from the 
group, an individual can still engage in the trade. What makes 
expulsion from the group effective at this early stage is that the group 
is not just a trading group, but also a social and religious community. 
For a believer, expulsion from a religious community may be worse 
than death. Insofar as human beings are social animals, social 
ostracism is always costly, and it is most costly at the extremes. 
Exclusion from a group that is itself discriminated against casts the 
outcast, provided she is identifiable, into the hell of isolated prejudice. 
Exclusion from a group that dominates society imposes tremendous 
indirect economic costs. The more fractured the society, the greater 
the cost of social exclusion. At the extreme, where society is just a 
collection of antagonistic groups competing over limited resources, 
expulsion may have severe consequences. 4 6  
Thus, before an ethnic or religious group has established 
dominance in a particular field of commerce, the noneconomic costs of 
group expulsion must be high for group expulsion to deter commercial 
opportunism effectively. This gives close-knit ethnic and religious 
groups a very large initial advantage in conducting trade. Over time, 
this advantage may be so great that such groups establish dominance 
within various lines of commerce.47 In this way, group membership 
becomes a prerequisite to market participation. Group dominance of 
the trade makes the economic costs of expulsion even greater than the 
noneconomic social and religious costs. As economic sanctions 
46. For evidence on· ostracism as a technique of social control, and its harsh effects, in 
such an unforgiving environment, see RICHARD B. LEE, THE !KUNG SAN: MEN, WOMEN, 
AND WORK IN A FORAGING SOCIETY (1979). 
47. When a group that begins to gain dominance in a lucrative trade has traditionally 
been discriminated against and is a political minority, dominant groups will react by 
attempting to legislate or otherwise gain control over the trade. From Jewish bankers in 
Europe to Chinese traders in South Asia, however, history shows that by the time such 
reaction begins, the once downcast group will often have acquired sufficient wealth and 
power to maintain and even enhance its economic and social position and rebuff the most 
costly reactionary action. See FRANCIS FUKUY AMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND 
THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 93 (1995) (discussing the success of Chinese merchant 
families in maintaining authority); LUCIAN w. PYE, ASIAN POWER AND POLITICS: THE 
CULTURAL DIMENSION OF AUTHORITY (1985). 
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become primary, ethnic and religious affiliation tends to lose its 
significance for sanctions and to become important primarily by 
ensuring that information regarding opportunistic commercial 
behavior is quickly and accurately communicated to other market 
participants. 
This account predicts one of Bernstein's most interesting empirical 
findings, that as both the insularity and local power of southern elites 
has diminished, the cotton trader and mill associations have found it 
necessary to manufacture their own institutions to replace the 
information-gathering and norm-communication functions previously 
provided by organic social and religious groups. 4 8  It also casts doubt, 
however, on her explanation of the differences between cotton and 
other commodities, such as grain. Bernstein maintains that cotton is 
special in that the quality of a particular lot of cotton is much more 
variable and subjective than, for instance, grain.4 9 This makes it sound 
as if grain comes off the field in standardized, clearly differentiated 
grades that can be objectively determined. Yet as demonstrated by 
environmental historian William Cronon, there is nothing natural 
about the classification of grain and feed into standard grades.50 As he 
recounts, prior to the advent of the railroad, grain was taken to market 
in sacks, and the contents of each sack "remained intact, unmixed with 
grain from other farms. Nothing adulterated the characteristic weight, 
bulk, cleanliness, purity, and flavor that marked it as the product of a 
particular tract of land and a particular farmer's labor. "51 The railroad 
changed all this: by rerouting settlement away from river valleys and 
toward railroad corridors, the railroad led to huge increases in both 
demand and supply. Even more crucially, by mixing hundreds of 
bushels of grain together in a single boxcar and then literally pouring 
it out into enormous grain elevators, the railroad severed the 
relationship between an individual producer and his product.52 The 
individual grower now had an incentive to adulterate his own grain, 
mixing wheat with lower-cost materials such as rye and chaff to 
increase its weight, and thus its value, at elevator sales. It was to 
overcome this incentive that the Chicago Board of Trade imposed 
standardized grades.53 The existence of reliable grades was moreover a 
direct consequence of the fact that the Board was equally balanced 
between buyers and sellers. 54 Wheat and other grains are the 
48. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1752-54. 
49. See id at 1745-46. 
50. WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 
107-20 (1991 ). 
. 
51. Id. at 107. 
52. Id. at 109-19. 
53. Id. 
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economists' paradigm for a homogeneous good, but they are 
homogeneous only because technological revolutions in grain 
transportation and storage made standardized grades economically 
imperative, not because they are naturally uniform. 
The history of grain standardization strongly cautions that an 
industry's or trade's economic structure is crucial in determining the 
relationship between the legal and extralegal worlds. Bernstein's 
investigations into the cotton and diamond trades are fascinating and 
valuable in large part because these are very unusual markets. They 
exemplify trades in which a relatively small and closely knit social 
group gained dominance, precisely the sort of trade in which one 
would expect extralegal norms to flourish. But as I argued above, the 
very success of such a group weakens the importance of its ethnic or 
religious affiliation. Gradually it is the prospect of losing the 
opportunity to make supracompetitive profits, rather than social 
ostracism, that becomes the strongest deterrent to opportunism. As 
Bernstein's cotton study shows, as the social group lessens in 
importance, market participants find it necessary to invest and 
produce substitute institutions that facilitate the formation and 
transmission of reputation; those created institutions, however, further 
weaken the functional value of ethnic and religious affiliation. As the 
historical evolution of the grain industry shows, once the number of 
market participants grows sufficiently large, individualized product or 
service reputation tends to vanish and standardized product grading 
replaces it. 
B. The Limited Lessons of Private Law for Article 2 Law Reform 
Much of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code aims to 
supply default terms for commercial dealings on highly competitive 
markets for standardized products. It is very difficult for nonlegal 
sanctions to develop into a significant force against opportunism on 
such markets. To see why, suppose heroically that there exists some 
way of ensuring that none of the many market participants would deal 
with an identified opportunist in the future. Even then, exclusion from 
a competitive market costs the opportunist only the competitive rate 
of return.ss Provided that there are sufficiently many such competitive 
markets with relatively low costs of entry, a cheater can simply 
54. Id. at 119. 
55. This result might seem to contradict the oft-cited result in Benjamin Klein & Keith 
B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. 
ECON. 615 (1981), that competition itself disciplines against opportunism. Their result, 
however, depends upon the assumption that sellers compete in a monopolistically 
competitive market with distinctly identifiable, branded products. Even more importantly, 
they do not consider multimarket settings in which opportunists can move from market to 
market. 
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continue to rove from market to market. Because it is easy to enter 
other markets, the primary nonlegal sanction of exclusion loses its 
bite. In such a world - the economist's ideal of many highly 
competitive markets - the equilibrium must be one in which there is 
a positive amount of opportunism in all markets.5 6 Most importantly, 
even when feasible (that is, even when information about cheating 
does get communicated widely and cheaters can actually be 
identified), nonlegal sanctions have no effect on the equilibrium level 
of cheating. 
This assumes that it is somehow possible to exclude an 
opportunistic buyer or seller from a perfectly competitive market. But 
perfect competition requires a very large number of buyers and sellers. 
And as the number of market participants increases, so too does the 
cost of communicating information regarding · past instances of 
opportunism. Nor can other market participants easily observe 
"opportunism" directly. What Ellickson calls "third party" sanctions57 
(that is, future refusals to deal by market participants other than the 
person harmed by a particular instance of opportunism) are therefore 
often triggered by reported rather than observed instances of 
opportunism. As the number of market participants increases, 
however, it becomes increasingly less likely that any given recipient of 
a report of opportunism is professionally acquainted with the reporter 
and believes that the report can be trusted. Without reliable reports of 
opportunism, the third-party sanctioning system cannot work. And 
second-party sanctions - a refusal by the victim to deal again with the 
opportunist - are a very weak sanction indeed on thick, competitive 
markets, where there are many fungible contracting opportunities. 
When there are competing markets, participants in any particular 
competitive market do of course have a direct interest in keeping the 
level of opportunism relatively low so as not to drive away potential 
customers. But extralegal sanctions do not do the job for them. This is 
clearly illustrated by American stock markets, which engage in 
organized and formal self-regulation as a means of policing 
opportunism.5 8  
There is  no reason to tailor legal rules to facilitate reputation 
formation when market structure does not allow for reputation 
formation. In a world with many highly competitive markets across 
which participants move easily and with relative anonymity, nonlegal 
56. With the equilibrium frequency of opportunism given credible expulsion determined 
by the condition that the return to opportunism net the cost of entering a new market after 
expulsion is equal to the return from staying in the original market but refraining from 
opportunism. 
57. ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 128 (1991). 
58. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997). 
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sanctions are weak and/or ineffective. In such markets, the argument 
for bright-line rules - that they facilitate the evolution of reputation­
based extralegal sanctions - does not apply. Hence in such markets 
there is good reason for the law to be more activist in attempting to 
discern and police contractual opportunism. To the extent such 
activism is enabled by Article 2's open-textured standards, those 
standards are economically justified. 
This is not to endorse every open-textured standard found in 
Article 2. It is crucial to stress that even in such markets, it remains 
true that false positives - false findings of opportunism - can 
convert legal rules designed to deter opportunism into instruments of 
opportunism. Hence, on competitive markets, it is appropriate for 
legal rules to attempt to mirror and require reasonable commercial 
behavior, but only those sorts of such reasonable behavior that can be 
verified accurately by courts. Inasmuch as Article 2 defaults to the 
market to determine what is "reasonable," it conforms to this 
prescription. Insofar as Article 2 endorses the search for course of 
performance and course of dealing, however, it becomes an 
instrument for rather than a tool against contractual opportunism. 
Article 2 applies equally to the polar situation of a highly 
customized contract between a buyer and seller with market power. 
As Bernstein's work demonstrates, participants in such markets 
quickly acquire reputations, and the market structure is such that 
information about a particular actor's behavior may be communicated 
quickly and credibly to a large fraction of the market population. The 
problem is that if an actor has too much market power, then nonlegal 
sanctions against that actor may lose their credibility and 
effectiveness. If, for instance, there is a monopoly in the production of 
a good that is a vital downstream input, then refusing to deal with the 
monopolist is not likely to be a credible sanction for its opportunistic 
behavior. The ultimate social goal is to make such markets more 
competitive. Increased competition brings not only the standard 
benefits of lower prices and expanded output, but also gives buyers a 
credible threat to discipline opportunism by refusing to deal again 
with opportunistic suppliers. In theory, by disciplining contractual 
opportunism, the law can lessen the risk of dealing with new, unknown 
suppliers and thereby play an important role in facilitating entry into 
such markets. In practice, the absence of commercial norms in the 
initially monopolized market may limit quite severely a court's ability 
to discern and enforce transitional norms. Still, even a very limited 
judicial role in policing the most egregious and general forms of 
opportunism (instances approaching fraud, for instance) can play a 
socially valuable role by encouraging buyers to deal with new 
suppliers. 
I thus believe that there are very strong theoretical reasons for 
thinking that the typical transactional dispute litigated under Article 2 
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of the Uniform Commercial Code emerges from a market and social 
structure that little resembles the world of the cotton industry 
explicated by Bernstein. At the present, however, this is merely a 
theoretical conjecture. Even if true, it does not detract from the 
enormous value of Bernstein's work. By getting the evidence first, and 
then developing a theoretical explanation, Bernstein's study not only 
advances our knowledge of private commercial lawmaking 
institutions, but provides a model for empirical legal scholarship more 
generally. 
